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Abstract 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are among the poorest countries in the world. They release little or no greenhouse gases 
emissions into atmosphere, making them the least responsible for climate change. Additionally, LDCs lack the finances, 
technology, and infrastructure to contribute to the enhancement of the international climate change regime. By all accounts these
countries have every incentive to free ride off the climate change policies and programs of other countries. Yet, instead of 
allowing the negotiations to be dominated by the wealthy Annex I countries, the LDCs choose to be active in the meetings of 
climate change regime. Applying network analysis to the UNFCCC COP 14 conference, this paper uncovers the participation 
patters of the LDCs with a particular emphasis on meetings involving technology transfer and financial mechanisms. 
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1. Introduction1
Participation costs. Free riding is cheap. In this paper participation involves making interventions in the 
conferences of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Free riding occurs when 
individuals attempt to shirk their obligations and impose the cost of action onto others (Becker 1983). Free riding is 
particularly difficult to avoid when public goods are involved. Environmental resources are a form of public goods, 
to which everyone is entitled and cannot be excluded (Little 1991:59; Olson 1971). A stable climate and clean air 
are a prime instance of public goods; everyone is equally entitled to the environment and cannot be excluded from it 
regardless of their actions. In the case of climate change, countries attempting to free ride have little incentive to 
contribute to the development and maintenance of an international policy regime and can instead choose to free ride 
off the actions of others (Olson 1971; Ward 1995). The motivation to free ride is considerable when the benefits of 
free riding drastically outweigh the costs of contributing. Thus, the urge to free ride is a factor for all countries 
participating in the climate change regime. Some would argue that the United States is free ridding off the countries 
that ratified the Kyoto Protocol, benefiting from the emissions reductions of other countries whilst they are 
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unencumbered by legally binding emissions reduction targets. Yet, this is not the conception of free riding that is 
being focused on in this paper; free riding is non-participation in the climate change regime, the UNFCCC. The cost 
of participation is higher for poorer nations, thus making the urge to free ride even more tempting to countries, 
which are economically and politically disadvantaged and are unable to contribute resources to the regime. LDCs 
meet a set of United Nations (UN) criteria: 1) low-income, 2) human resources weakness, and 3) economic 
vulnerability. The UN characterizes LDCs as “the poorest and weakest [countries suffering from]…extreme poverty, 
structural weaknesses of their economies, and the lack of capacities related to growth. [This is] compounded by 
structural handicaps, [which] hamper efforts of these countries to improve the quality of life of their people” (UN-
OHRLLS 2009). As of the mid-1960s the UN began to pay more attention to these vulnerable countries; recognizing 
that with their susceptibility to economic shocks and natural disasters they more vulnerable to the affects of climate 
change. These countries have very little technology or funds to contribute to the programs and projects directed 
mitigating climate change. As a result the participation of LDCs in the UNFCCC conference focuses more on 
receiving aide and assistance from other countries. In essence LDCs have incentives to avoid the cost of 
participation and instead free riding off the technology and resources of the wealthier countries.2
Thus, the main research question of this paper is why do LDCs participate in the climate change networks? What 
are their objectives what are main interests of the LDCs (as a collective) in the climate change networks? This paper 
is primarily designed to present a descriptive account of the participation patterns of countries and non-state actors 
in the annual meeting of the climate change conference, the UNFCCC. The participation patterns of these actors 
form a network of ties from the actors to the UNFCCC events they participate. Mapping these networks as a whole 
provides a foundation for understanding how these actors interact and negotiate within the UNFCCC. In addition to 
describing the UNFCCC networks as a whole, this paper also attempts to look at the participation patterns of a 
particular group of actors, the most vulnerable (and often overlooked) LDCs. The second section of this paper 
describes the LDC countries and the nature of their participation in the UNFCCC. The use of social network 
analysis (SNA) as an empirical tool is discussed in the third section. The fourth section of this paper uncovers the 
structure of the 2008 UNFCCC network and measures the role of LDCs in that network. The final section analyzes 
whether LDCs are able to overcome the urge to free ride and participate in the UNFCCC networks.      
2. LDCs and their Participation in the UNFCCC 
LDCs are a specific category of country, classified by the UN on the basis of three criteria: 1) low-income, 2) 
economic vulnerability, and 3) human resource weaknesses. The low-income criterion is based on a three-year 
average of a country’s gross national income (GNI) per capita.3 The second criterion is a country’s economic 
vulnerability, which is calculated using a country’s Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI). The EVI is based on 
indicators of instability in agricultural production, exports of goods and services, manufacturing, and merchandise 
export, a measure of economy proportion to population, and the impact on country’s percentage of population 
displaced by natural disasters (UN Website, Criteria for LDCs: 2003). The final criterion for categorizing countries 
as LDCs is the based on human resource weakness, which is calculated using the Human Assets Index (HAI). The 
HAI utilizes indicators such as nutrition, health, general education, and levels of adult literacy to calculate a 
country’s weakness. Each of these three criteria identifies the various facets of vulnerability facing a non-developed 
country, making their situation unique within the realm of international environmental politics. LDCs score within 
the lowest brackets of the EVI and HAI; they also have the lowest GNIs in the world, making them entirely 
vulnerable to effects of climate change. Now that a basic definition of LDCs has been established, it is possible to 
progress to understanding their behavior in the international politics of the UNFCCC.  
As Pettit explains the free rider effect “arises when everyone is better off if each contributes to a certain 
cause…the problem is how to persuade people to contribute when each may argue that others will succeed in 
2
 This paper is not a social commentary on the differentiated responsibilities; it presents the behavioral patterns of actors within the UNFCCC.   
3
 The baseline for inclusion as an LDC is a GNI of $750 (USD). Low-income is an important criterion for LDCs as the majority of these 
countries are also characterized as Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). The classification of a country as a LDC and a HIPC provides 
important economic baseline in which to understand the participation and interests of the LDCs in the UNFCCC financial programs and policies. 
Thirty of the LDC countries participate in the HIPC initiative (UN Website, HIPC Initiative Report, March 31, 2004). 
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furthering the cause…[and] he may as well save himself the trouble of contributing” (Pettit, 1986: 361).4 Neumayer 
reinforces this concept within the context of climate change politics; emphasizing that “all countries are better off 
with international environmental cooperation, but each of them also has an incentive to free-ride on the others’ 
efforts and to enjoy the benefits of abatement without incurring any of the costs of emission reduction” (Neumayer, 
2001: 124). As utilized in this paper the term “free riding” has as much narrow meaning than what Petite or 
Neumayer discuss, which imply a more global concept of free riding involving contributing to an overall 
environmental benefit. In this paper the term free ridding refers only to an actor’s preference to abstain from 
participating in the international conferences of UNFCCC in order to benefit from the policies without expending 
the cost of participation. To attempt to avoid free riding voluntary environmental regimes are designed to 
disincentives free riding through viable threats, which would leave all participating countries worse off (Neumayer, 
2001: 125). Truly, if too many countries chose to free ride, and not participate in the international conferences of the 
UNFCCC, the resulting lack of international cooperation would make all countries worse off. 
In certain circumstances, the concept of free riding can have a negative connotation; when a member of a group 
or society benefits without contributing to the cause they are considered free riders or freeloaders, this becomes 
more of a moral judgment than a practical evaluation. This is not the position of this paper; in this paper the 
conception of free riding is considered a natural occurrence in international politics, where it is likely that at least 
one actor will get more out an international agreement than they put in. As aforementioned, LDCs have reasonable 
incentives to completely free ride off the countries participating in the climate change regime by avoiding their own 
costs of attendance, while simultaneously benefiting from policies and financial programs. The argument that LDCs 
have incentives to free ride off the resources and actions of other actors in the UNFCCC is not meant as a comment 
of the character of LDCs, but merely as an optional course of action.   
The LDCs, which on average contribute less GHG emissions, assume that larger polluting Annex I countries will 
invest in reducing their emissions and safeguarding the environment. LDCs have no legal obligations or 
responsibilities to reduce their GHG emissions under the UNFCCC or contribute to the overall mitigation of climate 
change. In addition LDCs have very limited resources, technology, and infrastructure in which to actually contribute 
to the UN programs. Participating in the climate change regime involves attending the UNFCCC Conference of the 
Parties (COP) meetings, which are held in countries all over the world. The cost of plane travel and logging for 
delegates can be expensive. LDCs, with limited financial means have some difficulties attending the annual 
UNFCCC COP conferences.5 This financial difficulty highlights the potential motivations for LDCs to free ride 
within the UNFCCC.  
Yet, instead of completely free riding off the policies, resources, and funding derived by other countries in the 
UNFCCC, the LDC countries recognize the benefits of participating in the UNFCCC. LDCs are limited in finances 
and infrastructure, such that any action to reduce their GHG emissions or mitigate the impacts of climate change 
cannot occur without the assistance of other countries. Additionally, one could argue that by virtue of undertaking 
any projects LDCs are not free riding, but acting within their rational self-interest and that there is very little 
possibility of LDCs being capable of acting without assistance. Annex I6 countries are the wealthiest countries in the 
world and a several of them are the largest emitters of GHG emissions; these countries are required to provide 
financial resources to enable developing countries to adapt against the adverse effects of climate change.7 Invariably 
all of the climate change projects and programs undertaken by the LDCs are a result of the direct funding and 
assistance provided by Annex I countries. As a result the LDC countries are entitled to funds and resources from the 
Annex I countries without participating in a single UNFCCC conference.  
4
 Prime examples of free riding and collective action: Hardin (1968) and Olson (1971).  
5
 As was the case in August 2009, when the Maldives announced that due to budget constraints they would be unable to attend the COP 15 
conference in December 2009. This situation, while unfortunate for the Maldives, illustrates the difficulties LDCs face when participating in the 
UNFCCC. Eventually, Denmark donated a grant of 9.5 million Kroner to generate funding for countries to attend the COP 15 conference, which 
allowed the Maldives to re-evaluate their situation and renew their intention to attend COP 15 (Denmark website, 2009). 
6
 The UNFCCC defines Annex I countries as the industrialized countries that were members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) in 1992, plus countries with economies in transition (the EIT countries), including the Russian Federation and the 
Baltic States (UNFCCC Parties and Observers, 2009). Annex II countries are essentially the OECD countries of Annex I minus the EIT countries. 
In this paper the term Annex I will refer to both Annex II and Annex I countries, as Annex I is the more inclusive grouping. 
7
 Article 4.5, UNFCCC Convention Text. 
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Uncovering whether LDCs are participating or free riding off of the UNFCCC, requires mapping LDC 
participation patterns and comparing it to the participation patterns of other countries in a wider network of 
interactions. In this paper participation denotes making an intervention, or an oral statement, in a meeting at the 
UNFCCC COP conferences. The participation of actors in these events creates a network of interactions. The 
participation in a UNFCCC meeting generates a tie from the country (actor) to the meeting (event) in which they 
participated. The participation patterns are based on the interests of country or groups of countries. The interests of 
individual LDC countries varies widely, yet in the climate change regime there are a few overarching group 
interests, which seem to be central to the LDCs as a collective. LDCs participate in conference networks in order to 
develop, control, and otherwise shape climate change policies that will improve and perpetuate their ability to 
acquire resources and funding from Annex I countries. LDCs more actively participate in the specific issues and 
policies, which impact LDCs the most: 1) the LDC Fund, 2) Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) projects, 3) 
the Adaptation Fund, 4) technology transfers, and 5) other financial mechanisms.  
The specificity of the participation patterns of the LDCs in the UNFCCC networks and the strategic importance 
that the LDCs they place on certain meeting over others, it is tempting to simply say that the LDCs are acting with 
rational self-interest. At this level of study I feel it is inappropriate to claim that each of the participating LDC 
countries are acting rationally. The diversity of needs and interests of the various LDC countries makes it difficult to 
assess whether they are indeed acting with rational self-interest for their own country or if they have other motives 
based on their affiliations in coalitions. Countries classified as LDCs come from very different parts of the globe and 
face different environmental challenges.8 To support a claim of rational self-interest would require a more in-depth 
investigation into the specific needs of the individual LDC countries, which could then be compared directly to their 
participation in the network. This line of inquiry has merit and certainly warrants further research; however, for the 
scope of this paper examining it is only appropriate to argue that the LDCs have group interests in a few strategic 
areas, which are illustrated in the network analysis.9 To uncover this phenomenon I have chosen to take a network 
perspective, focusing on the patterns and frequency of participation by LDCs within the larger network of UNFCCC 
actors. Investigating how and in which meetings the LDCs participate within the UNFCCC reveals unique patterns 
of behavior in which LDCs strategically participate in meetings that directly affect them while disregarding others.  
3. Advantages to using Social Network Analysis 
Utilizing SNA instead of traditional statistics in this paper allows for a more complete study of how actors 
participate in the climate change meetings as well as a comparison between participating actors. SNA moves beyond 
the understanding of the attributes of actors, such as income, gender, or race, to behavioural and institutional models 
of analysis (Howlett 2002). The population of the network is all registered countries, NGOs, and UN 
representatives, but only participants who made an intervention in an event are connected to the network. The 
remaining non-intervening actors are considered isolates with no ties to the network. The data in this paper is two-
mode value data. The first mode is the actors: the countries, non-state actors, and UN organizations that are 
registered as participants in the UNFCCC. The second mode is the events: the UNFCCC meetings of the 2008 COP 
conference in Poland. Meetings, or events, in the COP 14 conference are distinguished by the timetables in the COP 
agendas (Daily Programmes, COP 14, 2008). The use of two-mode data is particularly beneficial, because it 
uncovers the relationships between the actors and the events, i.e. how the actors participate in the UNFCCC 
conferences, in addition identifying patterns of participation affiliation between the actors.10
Interventions in meetings are good indicator of participation patterns and a measure of how international actors 
overcome free riding by participating by strategically participating in meetings. Monitoring participation patterns in 
meetings shows what issues the LDCs target and how the operating in the networks in general. LDC participation in 
meetings within the networks shows how LDCs use interventions to benefit from the conference’s policies and 
8
 For example the needs of the small island nation of Tuvalu involve adaptation against the rising sea level, whereas the interests of the desert 
country of Afghanistan involve clean water supplies and improved living conditions for its people (UN-OHRLLS, LDC Country Profiles, 2008). 
9
 This paper does not intend to delve into the rationale for developing coalitions, cultivating group interests, or “organized interests,” 
however; Hojnacki (1997) provides an appropriate explanation for this behavior. For a discussion on group interests and the legal incentives for 
he participation of developing countries see Baumert (2006).  
10
 Actor-event networks and affiliation patterns are discussed in Davis, Gardner, and Gardner (1941).   
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funding. In measuring the interventions of actors this research uses valued data instead of binary data in the 
matrices. Using value data allows for the measurement of not only the participation of an actor in an event, but also 
the frequency in which that actor spoke within that event. For example the country of Saudi Arabia might have a 
value of 3.00 in one meeting this means that Saudi Arabia participated in one event, but made three interventions. 
Other actors may participate in multiple events with less frequency. France may participate in three meetings, but 
only make one intervention in each meeting. This creates a distinction in patterns of participation between multiple 
event participation (intervening in several different events) and high frequency participation (intervening several 
times in one event). 
4. Actor Participation in the UNFCCC Conference 
In the 2008 UNFCCC conference actors were discussing the advancement of the Bali Action Plan, the 
development and transfer of technologies, the financial mechanisms under the Convention, guidance for the Global 
Environmental Fund (GEF), the Nairobi work programme, as well as additional guidance for the LDCs Fund. The 
issues of the conference relate directly to the finances and programs that are of interest to the LDCs, warranting a 
high rate of LDC participation in the events of COP 14. One would expect that LDCs would focus their attention 
and make several interventions in meetings that cover these specific issues. Within the UNFCCC COP 14 network 
there are five categories of events, these are the main decision making bodies and their subsidiary bodies. The 
categorizations of the events are as follows: 1) the COP and Conference of the Parties Serving and the Meeting of 
the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP), 2) the Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), 
3) the Subsidiary Body on Implementation (SBI), the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Further Commitments for 
Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP), and the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Long-Term 
Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA).  
The COP is the decision making body under the UNFCCC Convention, it makes use of scientific and 
technological advice in order to develop policies and programs. Similar to the COP, the CMP is the governing body 
of the policies and programs of the Kyoto Protocol. Often the meetings of the COP and CMP cover similar issues 
and are combined into a single meeting; these meeting are known as joint high-level meetings. The SBSTA provides 
the COP and the CMP with specific advice on scientific, technological and methodological matters. The two 
predominant areas that SBSTA covers is promoting the development and transfer of environmentally-friendly 
technologies and improving the guidelines for preparing national communications and emission inventories 
(UNFCCC, SBSTA 2009). The SBI advises on issues concerning the implementation of the Convention. The SBI 
also reviews the financial assistance given to Non-Annex I parties, the financial mechanisms of the GEF and the 
LDCs Fund. The AWG-KP was developed to discuss the further commitments of Annex I countries under the Kyoto 
Protocol it was set to complete its work by the end of 2009 at COP 15. The final type of UNFCCC meeting is the 
AWG-LCA, which is responsible for advancing the Bali Action plan and furthering the commitments of Annex I 
parties beyond the first commitment period (post-2012). Different types of actors will participate more in the 
meetings that cover issues that they find important and less in other meetings.  In the case of the LDCs collective 
interests, this paper hypothesizes that the LDCs will focus their participation on the largest meetings, namely the 
joint high-level meetings of the COP/CMP, the technology transfer meeting of the SBSTA, and the finance meeting 
in the SBI. This section will first describe and analyze the participation of LDCs in COP 14 as a whole network and 
then perform a more in depth investigation into the sub-networks of COP 14 created by the different types of 
meetings.   
4.1. LDC Participation in COP 14 (2008) 
The ties between the actors and events are measured by their outdegree, an actor with an outdegree of 4.00 
participated in four events. The actors that are the largest participants in the entire COP 14 network are France 
(22.00)11, Saudi Arabia (21.00), China (19.00), Australia (17.00), Japan (17.00), India (13.00) and Brazil (13.00). 
11
 During the 2008 UNFCCC Conference France served as the coalition leader for the European Union, speaking on behalf of the twenty-
seven EU member states. As the coalition leader for the EU, France’s high outdegree is to be expected. 
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These actors have the highest outdegree centrality measures (22.00 – 13.00) within the network and spoke at several 
events. As expected, none of the actors with the highest oudegrees, or highest participation rates, within the network 
are LDC countries. 
Out of forty-nine LDCs registered to attend the UNFCCC COP 14 conference, only thirty-two are connected to 
this network. Thirty-two LDCs participated in a minimum of one meeting in the conference. The remaining twenty 
LDC member countries did not participate in the conference.12 Eleven LDC countries in only spoke at one event, an 
outdegree centrality of 1.00, meaning that eleven of LDC countries (Lesotho, Sudan, Angola, Lao, Chad, 
Afghanistan, Mozambique, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, Niger, and Burkina Faso) only made one intervention in one 
event. Ten LDCs (Congo, Gambia, Bhutan, Samoa, Timor-Leste, Guinea, Cambodia, Senegal, Liberia, and Solomon 
Islands) have an outdegree centrality of 2.00, participating in two different events. 
Yet, not all LDCs have low outdegree centrality measures; Tuvalu has an outdegree centrality of 10.00, 
intervening in ten different events. The other LDCs with mid-high outdegrees are Bangladesh with an outdegree of 
8.00, the Maldives and Tanzania with outdegrees of 6.00, and Mali and Nepal have outdegrees of 4.00. The higher 
outdegree centralities of these LDCs are interesting, but not extraordinary. For the COP 14 conference Tuvalu was 
the coalition leader for the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS).13 Thus, when Tuvalu intervened in the ten 
meetings they were speaking on behalf of their coalition group. If any one of the members of AOSIS requested an 
issue be raised in an event, then Tuvalu made an intervention. At the 2008 UNFCCC conference the Maldives and 
Bangladesh were the coalition leaders for the LDCs, speaking on behalf of the forty-nine LDC countries. Tanzania 
was a coalition leader of the Group of 77 and China (G77). The G77 is a coalition of one hundred and thirty 
countries “which provides the means for the countries of the South to articulate and promote their collective 
economic interests and enhance their joint negotiating capacity” (Group of 77, Webpage). Acting as coalition 
leaders explains the higher outdegrees of Tuvalu, Maldives, Bangladesh, and Tanzania, charged with intervening on 
behalf of several countries. The non-coalition leader LDCs intervene on their own behalf; the non-coalition leader 
LDCs with the highest participation are Nepal and Mali, each with an outdegree of 4.00. The larger network reveals 
that the majority of the LDC actors only participate once within the UNFCCC network of events, choosing to only 
participate in one of the joint high-level meetings of the COP/CMP.  
Viewing the entire set of 2008 UNFCCC events gives us a picture of LDCs interactions in the larger UNFCCC 
network, but having too many overlapping events in one network can unwittingly conceal smaller patterns within 
the networks. In order to pinpoint the participation patterns of LDCs in the specific meetings involving technologies 
and financial mechanisms, it is relevant to separate the different types of events in order to view the participation in 
the sub-networks. The next sections will describe and analyze the five distinct sub-networks to determine if the 
hypothesize are supported. 
4.2. Actor Participation in Sub-Networks 
The first sub-network is comprised of the COP and CMP meetings. As the decision making bodies of the 
UNFCCC, the COP and the CMP are in the largest sub-network of the 2008 UNFCCC conference with one hundred 
and seventy actors participating in thirteen events (Figure 1). The participation of several actors expected, because 
five of the events within this sub-network were joint COP/CMP high-level segments. In the joint high-level 
meetings each actor is allocated approximately 5 – 10 minutes to speak, allowing for a maximum number of actors 
to participate in a single meeting. This generates a high indegree centrality (ties directed into the event), with several 
actors participating in that event. Evidence of these ministerial statements can be seen in the clustering of actors 
around three particular events: 1) COP14-M3/CMP4-M5-11.1.08, 2) COP14-M4/CMP4-M6-12.12.08, and 3) 
COP14-M5&6/CMP4-M7&8-12.12.08. Twenty-three of the twenty-nine LDCs that participated in the entirety of 
the COP/CMP events intervened at one of the main three high-level segments. The actors with the highest 
participation in the COP/CMP meetings are China and Saudi Arabia with outdegrees of 6.00, participating in six of  
12
 The lack of participation of the remaining twenty LDCs does not signify their absence from the conference nor does it diminish their value 
to the conference it merely indicates that they did participate in any of the meetings and thus have no ties to the network component. 
13
 AOSIS is a coalition of thirty-nine members and four observer countries that share development challenges and vulnerabilities, they act as 
an ad hoc negotiation group for small islands within the United Nations.  
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Figure 1: Actor / Event Network – COP 14 / CMP 4 
the thirteen events. The actors with the second highest participation rates are Colombia and South Africa with an 
outdegree of 5.00. The LDCs with the highest participation is Bangladesh speaking on behalf of the LDCs, Tuvalu 
on behalf of AOSIS, and Tanzania as a coalition leader of the G77, each with an outdegree of 3.00. The second 
highest participation by LDCs is the Maldives and Senegal each with an outdegree of 2.00. The frequency at which 
the LDCs participated in the COP events is relatively low with the thinnest lines tying them to the events, indicating 
they only made one statement in each event. The exception is Tuvalu, Tanzania, and Bangladesh speaking 2 – 3 
times in the meetings in which they participated.
Twenty-nine LDCs out of thirty-two total LDCs, which participated in the entire conference, participated in the 
COP/CMP sub-network that constitutes 90% of the LDC participation in the UNFCCC. Yet, LDC participation in 
the COP/CMP network is still relatively small compared to the other actors, the twenty-nine LDCs that participated 
in the network represent only 17% of the network. LDCs participation in the high-level segments is important, but it 
does not showcase the LDCs’ interests in the resources or funding of the UNFCCC. To impact the allocation of 
resources and funding the LDCs need to participate in more substantive meetings, such as the technical and policy 
development meetings, which take place in the SBSTA and the SBI.  
4.2.1. SBSTA 
The SBSTA network (Figure 2) consists of sixty-one actors participating in four events; the thickness of the line 
between actors and events is sized according to the frequency at which the actor participated in the event. France, 
intervened five times in the 3rd SBSTA meeting and four times in the 2nd SBSTA meetings indicated by the thick 
black lines tying the actor to those particular events. The LDC countries interested in the resources and technology 
of the Annex I parties, should focus their participation on the SBSTA meetings, making several interventions. Yet, 
when the four SBSTA sub-network are separated out of the larger network of the conference there appears to be the 
same dominance of actors in the network. France and Japan have the largest outdegree centrality of 4.00, speaking 
every one of the SBSTA events. The actors with the next highest oudegrees (3.00) are Saudi Arabia, China, India, 
Australia, Norway, Brazil, and Panama.   
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Figure 2: Actor-Event Network – SBSTA 29 
Six LDCs participated in the SBSTA meetings, all of whom have an outdegree of 1.00. Additionally, LDCs only 
participated in the first and second SBSTA meetings. The first SBSTA meeting covered the adoption of the agenda, 
election of officers and the chair, the Nairobi work programme, and the development of transfer of technologies. 
The Nairobi Work Programme and the development of transfer technologies are important to the LDCs. The two 
LDCs that participated in the first meeting of the SBSTA were the Maldives and Mail. The first SBSTA meeting 
focused on organization matters and adoption of the agenda, in addition to a discussion on the Nairobi Work 
Programme on adaptation and vulnerability, as well as the development of transfer of technologies. Issues of 
adaptation, vulnerability, and technology are all very important to LDCs and would have merited a higher 
participation rate than what is displayed in the network.  
The second SBSTA meeting covered more substantive issues such as the development and transfer of 
technologies, reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries, technical review of greenhouse gas 
inventories from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention, methodological issues under the Kyoto Protocol, 
carbon dioxide capture and storage, and Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change. Transfer of technologies, reduced emissions from deforestation in developing countries, and carbon capture 
and storage are issues that are critical to the LDCs. The majority of the LDCs rely on their forests for energy and 
industry, thus the preservation of these forests is a central issue for LDCs. Four of the six LDCs that participated in 
the SBSTA events participated in the 2nd meeting; these were Tuvalu, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Congo. Yet, the 
LDCs that participated in the SBSTA events had a low participation frequency, speaking only once in the events. 
This participation rate of LDCs in SBSTA meetings lower than expected, particularly in meetings dealing with such 
relevant issues as avoided deforestation and technology transfer. Out of the total sixty-one actors that participated in 
the SBSTA meetings, LDCs only made up 10% of the network of SBSTA participants. The SBSTA network shows 
a lower participation rate in the SBSTA meetings than desired to support the hypothesis.   
4.2.2. SBI 
The SBI meetings cover the financial mechanisms and implementation process for environmental programs. 
Direct funding and mechanisms to provide financial assistance to Non-Annex I countries are issues that would be 
group interests to the LDCs. The SBI actor-event network displayed in Figure 3 reveals a divergence between the 
SBI and the SBSTA meetings. The SBI has five events, but only fifty-one actors. The largest node is still France 
with an outdegree of 5.00 intervening all of the SBI events. Yet, the LDCs are more active in the SBI meetings than  
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Figure 3: Actor-Event Networks – SBI 29 
they were in the SBSTA. Out of the fifty-one actors in the SBI network seventeen are LDC actors. Four LDCs: 
Nepal, Tanzania, Mali, and the Maldives each have an outdegree of 2.00. The 3rd SBI meeting covered capacity 
building under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, the establishment of funding, insurance, and transfers of 
technologies. The issues of finance and technology transfer are critical to LDC countries, yet the 3rd SBI meeting 
uncovers another essential subject for LDCs, insurance.14 The structure and implementation of insurance, 
particularly how funds are allocated, is a pertinent issue for LDCs. The high concentration of LDC related issues in 
the 3rd SBI meeting would merit a high rate of participation. Six LDCs participated in the 3rd SBI meeting, the third 
highest LDC participation of the network, just below the joint high-level meetings.  
The SBI event with the highest participation of LDC countries was the 2nd meeting of the SBI, with a 
participation rate higher than any of the joint high-level meetings. The 2nd SBI meeting covered issues such as the 
financial mechanisms of the Convention, the GEF, the LDC Fund, development and transfers of technologies, and 
other matters relating to developing countries. The 2nd SBI meeting has the highest number of participants of the 
SBI meetings, with an indegree of 38.00. The discussion of financial matters in the 2nd SBI meeting is a high point 
of focus for the LDCs. Thirteen LDCs participated in the 2nd SBI meeting, almost twice as many LDC participants 
than any other event in the COP 14 conference. The 2nd SBI meeting focuses on financial matters corroborates the 
initial hypothesis that LDCs will focus their participation on SBI meetings involving their sources of funding. 
On a closer inspection of the SBI actor-event network (Figure 3) the SBI meetings not only have a larger number 
of LDC participants, but a higher frequency of LDC interventions. Even the LDCs actors that are participating in 
only one SBI event are participating at a higher rate of frequency. This is am important point of comparison between 
meetings. Approximately seven LDCs participated in each joint high-level meeting, yet they only made a single 
intervention in that meeting. Conversely, in the SBI meetings LDCs may have only participated in one meeting, but 
they intervened in that meeting multiple times. Bangladesh only participated in the 2nd meeting of the SBI 
14
 Insurance in the UNFCCC is designed to give LDCs and other vulnerable countries a means of recovering and rebuilding their countries 
after a natural disaster. 
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(outdegree 1.00), but they intervened three times in that one meeting (frequency of 3.00). Three interventions in the 
2nd SBI meeting by Bangladesh indicates a considerable interest in the issues being discussed in that particular 
meeting. In addition, as the coalition leader of the LDCs, Bangladesh’s multiple interventions indicates that the LDC 
countries as a collective had an interest in these issues discussed in the 2nd SBI meeting. Uganda as the chair of the 
LDC Expert Group (LEG), made two interventions, presenting a statement on the LDC Fund and reporting 
specifically on the matters and needs of LDCs. Uganda only intervened in three meetings throughout the entire 
UNFCCC conference and their focus was on the SBI. As the chair of the LEG, Uganda’s participation was primarily 
concerned with the financial mechanisms designated for LDCs. The elevated levels of participation both in 
outdegree and frequency indicate that the SBI meetings, particularly the financial meetings were in critical for the 
LDCs. This supports the hypothesis that LDCs participate in the events, which directly reflect their group interests 
for obtaining resources, funding, and technology. 
4.2.3. AWG-KP 
The AWG-KP is the smallest sub-network with twenty-nine actors and four events. The small size of the AWG-
KP network is not surprising considering it is an Ad Hoc Working Group developed exclusively for advancing the 
commitments of Annex I countries under the Kyoto Protocol. The AWG-KP meeting format is slightly different 
from the other meetings; in the AWG-KP actors make presentations on research and implementation progress of 
climate change programs and then answer questions. The two events with the most participation was Part II of the 1st
meeting and the 2nd meeting of the AWG-KP. The presenters in Part II of the 1st meeting were the UNFCCC 
Secretariat, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the International Energy Agency (IEA), the 
European Union, Japan, the Russian Federation, Tuvalu on behalf of AOSIS, Canada and New Zealand. The 
presentations made by these actors as well as answer session accounts for at least one of the interventions in Part II 
of the 1st SBI meeting. The remaining countries that participated in Part II of the 1st SBI meeting (Benin, Egypt, 
India, Belarus, South Africa, Algeria, and Brazil) were most likely the actors asking the questions of the presenters.  
Given the specific purpose of the AWG-KP one would suspect that the network of actors would predominately be 
Annex I countries. Yet, the actor with the highest participation in the AWG-KP was Saudi Arabia with an outdegree 
of 4.00. The actors with the second highest outdegrees of 3.00 were France, Tuvalu, Brazil, New Zealand, Australia, 
China, and Russia. Only ten of the twenty-nine actors that participated in the AWG-KP were Annex I countries, 
which is only 34% of the AWG-KP network of actors. Of the remaining nineteen countries participated in the 
AWG-KP only three were LDCs: Tuvalu, Benin, and Gambia. The lack of LDC participation in the AWG-KP is 
expected considering the events focused issues relating to Annex I countries, which is a lower priority for LDC 
countries. The only substantial LDC participant in the AWG-KP was Tuvalu (outdegree of 3.00), which delivered a 
presentation in Part II of the 1st meeting. LDC participation in the AWG-KP was considerably less than in the other 
sub-networks. The hypothesis of this paper does not address the participation of LDCs in the AWG-KP directly, 
however the low participation rate corroborates the assumption that LDCs avoid participating in meetings that do 
not cover issues relevant to the LDCs.  
4.2.4. AWG-LCA 
The AWG-LCA is charged with supporting Annex I countries with developing new commitments beyond the 
year 2012 and furthering the building blocks of the Bali Action Plan. Taking into account the focus of the AWG-
LCA on the actions of Annex I countries, one would expect a similarly low participation rate of LDCs in the AWG-
LCA as there was in the AW-KP. The AWG-LCA network, however, is much larger than the AW-KP with seventy-
nine actors participating in seven events. In the AWG-LCA the actor with the highest participation was France on 
behalf of the EU with an outdegree of 7.00, participating in all of the AWG-LCA meetings. The second largest 
participants were Japan and Saudi Arabia each participating in five AWG-LCA events (outdegree 5.00). The 
predominance of France, on behalf of the EU, within the AWG-LCA network is to be expected given the issue 
concentration on Annex I countries within the meetings.  
Thirteen LDCs participated in the AWG-LCA meetings, the third largest participation of LDCs in a sub-network, 
behind the COP/CMP and the SBI meetings. The LDCs focused on participating in the AWG-LCA contact group 
for risk management and insurance mechanisms. As uncovered in the SBI meetings the issue of insurance is an 
important issue to LDCs. Risk management assessment works in conjunction with insurance to estimate the 
vulnerability, environmentally and financially, of a particular country. The discussion and development of these 
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issues would be valuable to the LDCs. The contact group for risk management meeting consisted of seven 
presentations made by: 1) Bangladesh on behalf of the LDCs, 2) The Federation of Micronesia on behalf of the 
Small Island Developing States (SIDS), 3) France for the EU, 4) China, 5) Peru, 6) Switzerland, and 7) the 
Philippines. In addition to Bangladesh’s participation, four other LDCs participated in the AWG-LCA contact group 
Tuvalu, Malawi, Togo, and Samoa. The LDC participation in the AWG-LCA meetings are less than the COP/CMP 
and the SBI meeting, which confirms the hypothesis their prominence in the network as focal points for the LDCs. 
However, the LDC participation in the AWG-LCA far outweighs their participation in the SBSTA meetings, which 
were also hypothesized to be highly participated meetings by the LDCs. The higher participation of LDCs in the 
AWG-LCA meetings over the SBSTA meetings further refutes the hypothesis on SBSTA meetings. Yet, the focus 
on insurance and risk management reaffirms the LDCs’ strategic participation in meetings relating to financial 
mechanisms.     
5. Overall Results and Conclusions 
It is important to note that the direct comparison between the whole network and its sub-networks networks 
should be contextualized and understood that the structure, number of nodes, and compositions are distinctive. The 
percent of LDC actors that participated in the various sub-networks is displayed in Table 1. Out of the thirty-two 
total number of LDC countries that participated in the COP 14 conference meetings, the vast majority (91%) 
participated in the COP/CMP meetings, the majority of whom intervened in the joint high-level meetings. This 
confirms the first hypothesis that the main focus of the LDCs would be participating in the joint high-level meetings 
of the COP/CMP. The calculations in Table 1 also confirm that after the joint high-level meetings the LDCs 
participated primarily in the SBI events, which involved the LDC Fund and matters relating to the LDC countries. 
LDCs by definition have limited resources, i.e. people to attend the events, thus LDCs participate in the events that 
cover the issues they are most interested. Moreover, LDCs attempting secure more resources and funding would 
participate in the events involving technology transfers, funding, and resource management. The meetings, which 
cover these issues, are the technology transfer meetings in the SBSTA and the finance meetings in the SBI.    
As a result this paper hypothesized that, outside of the COP/CMP joint high-level meetings, the meetings of the 
SBSTS and the SBI will have the highest LDC participation. The technology transfer meetings of the SBSTA do not 
support this hypothesis, because only 19% of the total number of LDCs participated in the SBSTA meetings. The 
low LDC participation in the SBSTA is a bit unexpected considering that the meetings covered important issues 
such as the development and transfer of technologies and reducing emissions from deforestation in developing 
countries. The importance of the development and implementation of the financial mechanisms in the SBI appears 
to have warranted higher participation rate than technology transfers or deforestation of the SBSTA meetings. 
Table 1: Actor Participation Rates 
Sub-Networks LDCs Totals % LDC / Total
% LDCs / 32 
network LDCs
COP / CMP 29 173 17% 91%
Joint High-Level COP / CMP 25 150 17% 78%
SBSTA 6 61 10% 19%
SBI 17 51 33% 53%
AWG-KP 4 29 14% 13%
AWG-LCA 13 79 16% 41%
The financial meetings of the SBI warranted the participation of over half (53%) of the LDCs that participated in 
the 2008 conference. The LDCs also represented a sizeable portion (33%) of the total number of actors that 
participated in the SBI meetings. Additionally, the 2nd SBI meeting had the highest concentration of LDC 
participation (13 actors) in the entire UNFCCC network. The highest participation of LDCs in SBI events was a 
result of the issues covered in the meeting, such as the GEF and the LDC Fund, which supports the view that the 
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collective interests of the LDCs would focus their attention on events that directly relate to LDC issues, such as 
financial mechanisms. LDCs attempting to control and promote their sources of funding through the UNFCCC 
concentrated their participation on the SBI meetings.  
Confirming the participation of the LDCs in the finance meetings of the SBI over the other meetings in the 
UNFCCC not only uncovers the strategic nature of LDC participation, but also reveals how participation prevails 
over the incentives to free ride. In the 2008 forty-seven LDCs registered to attend the UNFCCC conference in 
Poland, meaning that 96% of the LDCs recognized the importance of attending the UNFCCC conference over free 
ridding. Interestingly enough two of the LDC countries, Burundi and Somalia, were absent from the list of registered 
participants, indicating they did not attend the conference. The argument that Burundi and Somalia should not be 
considered free riders due to financial constraints, lacking the capacity to attend; is a less viable justification because 
of the existence of funding to financially aide country attendance, as was the case with the Maldives. This indicates 
that despite potential aide to attend the conferences Burundi and Somalia chose to not participate, thus 
demonstrating the existence of free riding in the climate change conferences. Yet, the vast majority of the LDCs did 
overcome the inclination to free ride and attended the conference, with 68% of the attending LDCs participating in 
the meetings. The high-level of LDC attendance and participation in meetings reveals that LDCs were able to 
overcome the urges to free ride and their specific participation patterns confirms the hypothesis that the group 
interests of LDCs are focused on financial matters. 
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